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The need to promote a donation culture in Me´xico has become of vital im-
portance, given that the waiting list for organ transplantation grows faster than the
number of patients that receive a transplant each year. People with end-stage renal
disease are anxious to get a kidney transplant; this kind of treatment is the most
economical one given the high cost of dialysis.
Through the use of real data, we want to show the impact and beneﬁt of
kidney exchange programs, illustrating how can a kidney exchange program could
be carried out in the state and in the country and its consequences on people’s lives
by improving their quality of life by reducing their time in the waiting list It is worth
mentioning that such programs have already been successfully implemented in other
countries.
x
Abstract xi
In the kidney exchange problem, when modeled as a graph, incompatible pairs
of patient-donor are considered as nodes, and the edges reﬂect the compatibility
with other pairs, with the donor of a pair donating his/her kidney to the patient in
another pair, and so on. Usually, the donors are family members or very close friends.
In some cases, there is an extremely generous person, so-called altruistic donor, who
decides to donate a kidney to anyone in need. When such donors exist, we can make
two different considerations regarding the mechanism of matching between donor
and recipient.
A cycle is an ordered list of pairs of patient-donor, such that one incompatible
pair donates a kidney, and another incompatible pair receives a kidney, and so on,
until the last incompatible pair donates a kidney to the ﬁrst pair that started the
donations. A pair is assigned to at most one cycle. A chain is an ordered list
of pairs of patient-donor in which the donations are started by an altruistic donor
giving his/her kidney to a patient in an incompatible pair. The next pair received a
kidney provided by an already beneﬁted pair. This succession of donations continues
until it breaks the pattern or the next donation is made to the waiting list.
The kidney exchange problem (KEP) is a combinatorial optimization problem.
Given a graph of compatibilities between incompatible pairs and/or with altruistic
donors, ﬁnd cycles and/or chains of maximal cardinality. We consider different ex-
periments, analyzing the impact of the implementation of kidney exchange programs
under different scenarios. The following three databases in the state of Nuevo Leo´n
are considered:
• A waiting list from Coordinacio´n de Trasplantes de O´rganos y Tejidos (state)
that includes small private hospitals and public hospitals from the state with
1086 patients.
• A waiting list from the San Jose´ Hospital (local) with 35 patients.
• A waiting list from the Dr. Jose´ Eleuterio Gonza´lez University Hospital (local)
with 15 patients.

Chapter 1
Introduction
Kidney failure, also called end-stage renal disease (ESRD), is the last stage of a
disease in which your kidneys fail, meaning that they do not work well enough for
the person to survive without dialysis or a kidney transplant.
Currently, in Me´xico, there are a lot of people waiting for a kidney transplant.
Commonly this takes several years, making that the majority of people are already
dead before this ever happens. In 2018, 15,072 people were registered in the nation-
wide waiting list [8], as for this same year only 3048 transplants were reported this
causing that more than twelve thousand people keep waiting for a transplant for one
more year, actually this list has grown considerably and for this moment in middle
of 2019 has 17,367 people waiting for a kidney transplant.
Taking those information, if for every patient waiting to have a transplant there
exists one person willing to donate, even when they may be no longer compatible or
not be compatible since a begin, there is a possibility of searching for another donor,
and considering that this could be affecting not only to this pair of persons but to
many other too; then if we gather all this persons and search among them we could
create new pairs between all the persons needing of a transplant and the donors to
create good matches that beneﬁts the most people possible.
The matching in a kidney exchange program can be differentiated in two
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ways, cycles and chains. Cycles are ordered lists of patient-donor pairs (PDPs)
(pd1, pd2, ..., pdn) where every donor of pair pdi points or gives his/her kidney to
patient of pair pdi+1 [29]. The actual surgeries of the related resulting matchings are
performed simultaneously to avoid unwanted incompatibilities between the persons
involved, forming what we call a cycle, and where each patient cannot be involved
in more than one cycle.
From a different point of view, a person that is willing to donate an organ
without any reward is called an altruistic donor, someone not associated with the
patient but willing to donate a kidney to someone in need. With the introduction
of this type of donor, we have non-directed (ND) exchanges. In these exchanges, an
altruistic donor gives his kidney to a patient that is on a kidney exchange program,
and the recipient’s donor gives his kidney to the next patient that is compatible on
the waiting list or is directed to the deceased donor waiting list and creates what
we call a chain; the exchange starts with an altruistic donor and continues pointing
to the next pair of patient-donor, with donor of a given pair points or gives his/her
kidney to the patient of the following pair in the chain, until the chain is broken or
the donation is directed to the list of deceased people.
There are records of these types of procedures that have been carried out in
Me´xico. A clear example of this is the ﬁrst kidney exchange performed on living
donors realized in the Juarez Hospital in Me´xico [7]. In this case, the donor was
incompatible with his loved ones because of not having the same blood type. When
a match is found, the corresponding patient is removed from the waiting list. As
more matches are found, the waiting lists evidently becomes shorter and so does the
waiting times for the remaining patients in the list.
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1.1 Motivation
Kidney exchange is not a new topic around the world. Many countries have studied
how they can innovate kidney exchange programs that are already implemented.
Some organizations working on these programs in the USA are the following:
1. OPTN/UNOS Kidney Paired Donation Program1. Having the mis-
sion and vision that every kidney transplant with an incompatible but willing
and approved living donor receives a living donor kidney transplant, they de-
veloped a successful kidney paired donation (KPD) program with universal
access to all members of the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Net-
work (OPTN), which prioritizes the medical and psychosocial safety of living
donors and candidates.
2. UCLA Kidney Exchange Program2. It is a program that for more than
50 years has been a national leader in both clinical research and academic
excellence, performing more than 300 transplantations each year.
3. Alliance for Paired Donations.3 Their mission is straightforward, namely
to save lives by securing a living donor kidney transplant for every patient who
needs one.
In Me´xico, there are no kidney exchange programs to the best of my knowledge.
The statistics for the country are as follows:
1. In 2018, 15,072 patients were on the waiting list [8].
2. Me´xico performed only 3,048 transplants in 2018 [6].
1United Network for Organ Sharing [US]. Kidney paired donation - UNOS.
https://unos.org/transplant/kidney-paired-donation/
2UCLA Health. UCLA Kidney Exchange Program. Los Angeles, CA.
https://www.uclahealth.org/transplants/kidney-exchange
3Alliance for Paired Kidney Donation. https://paireddonation.org/
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3. The growth in the last ten years of living donations of kidneys is merely 11%.
As such programs have a huge boom in other countries and because of the need
for such programs, we hope that with this study we can develop a program that
provides guidelines for transplants with the information that is already available for
the state and the country.
With the implementation of a kidney exchange program in Me´xico or only
with the use of this scheme in each hospital, the waiting list would diminish and the
quality of life of the patients would improve, together with a substantial reduction
in treatments for their disease.
1.2 Objectives
• To obtain real information about patients on the kidney waiting list.
• To provide a full assessment of the potential impact of establishing a kidney
exchange program based on real-world data of Mexican hospitals and institu-
tions.
• To evaluate kidney exchange programs under different scenarios depending
whether cycles and/or chains are allowed.
• To solve and show actual solutions of current databases by means of developing
speciﬁc case studies.
1.3 Contribution
The idea of a kidney transplant for the people on the waiting list may feel so far away
from reality because in Me´xico the waiting list keeps increasing every year. The main
Chapter 1. Introduction 5
problem in Me´xico regarding kidney transplantation is not having a kidney exchange
program as in other countries, affecting many sick people in need of a transplant.
With the introduction of the recompiled information of the incompatible pairs
in Me´xico and including those rare cases in which an altruistic person is willing
to donate a kidney, there would be a good basis for starting a well-implemented
kidney exchange program, giving a life opportunity to all the persons currently on
the waiting list.
In this thesis, we conduct a case of study on the implementation of a kidney
exchange program in Me´xico. We use information about patients on the waiting
list and about patients in hemodialysis in different institutions in Nuevo Leo´n, such
as San Jose Hospital, Dr. Jose´ Euleterio Gonzalez University Hospital, and all
the public clinics and small private hospitals of the state. In addition, we use the
available information of the Centro Nacional de Trasplantes (CENATRA).
The main contribution of this thesis is the assessment of the potential impact
of having a kidney exchange program in Me´xico based on experiments carried out
on real-world databases.
The objective of the experiments is to show the real impact of implementing
this kind of program in Me´xico or, more realistically, in Nuevo Leo´n, assuming
availability of living donors. The results show the tremendous positive impact of
kidney exchange programs in Mexican soil.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 From Kidney Transplant to a Kidney
Exchange Program
Like any other disease, kidney disease can be temporary or can start with the symp-
toms of chronic kidney disease (CKD) that are involved in end-stage renal disease,
in which the affected person needs a transplant to survive [2]. It is reported [27]
that even in the US, a country with years of experience implementing kidney ex-
change programs, 3971 patients died while they were on the waiting list expecting a
transplant in 2004.
When a patient has end-stage renal disease, there are only two treatment op-
tions left: (1) constant dialysis treatment, which ﬁnally ends with the need for a
transplant, a treatment that becomes very expensive over time; (2) a transplant,
which is a cheaper treatment and the best option for the patient.
The treatment of hemodyalisis can keep a patient alive despite his renal failure.
This process is carried out by the use of an artiﬁcial kidney, which is a machine that
puriﬁes the human blood, which is the normal function of the kidney every day. This
treatment has been improved since it was ﬁrst used for the control of renal disease.
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A problem that can affect a patient when he is considering undergoing a trans-
plant is the incompatibility that can exist between the patient and the potential
donor. In [21] it is shown that in the United States in 2004, 30% of living donors
(persons willing to donate a kidney to a recipient with end-stage renal disease) were
biologically unrelated with their recipient because of the ABO blood type or a cross-
match incompatibility affecting the direct donation. Another factor that affects the
donation is the time that the patient is on the waiting list, making him sicker and
losing the opportunity to have the next kidney available from a cadaveric donor (a
kidney donation from a deceased donor).
In other words, the donated kidney can come from a person who died and
decided to donate his/her organs and whose kidney is healthy. The kidney can also
come from a living person because studies have shown that a person can live with
only one kidney. A person who has died and donated a kidney is called a deceased
donor [20]. A living donor is a person who decided to donate one of his/her kidneys.
This person can be a blood relative such as a parent, brother, or sister or may be a
non-blood relative, such as wife or a husband; in some cases, this is a friend or even
a stranger willing to donate.
One problem that can occur once the transplant has been performed is rejec-
tion. It can occur when a person that received a transplant, even when it was a
successful surgery, creates antibodies against the new tissue, such that it starts to
lose functionality and the organ is rejected.
This kind of exchanges these days come from swaps between incompatible
donors and recipients for obtaining a compatible donor. These markets are examples
of barter exchanges ; a barter exchange is a swap between agents (for this thesis,
patients) that are seeking to swap some items (the incompatible donors) with each
other. The swap is made with cycles of these agents, with each agent receiving an
item of the next agent in the cycle.
There are many examples of barter exchanges in history:
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• Book exchanges in which people are interested to obtain new books to read.
• Car exchanges with the objective of obtaining a better car.
• House exchanges for holidays or vacations, among others.
For many years, these exchanges occurred for the needs of people around the
world. For example, when they went on vacation and wanted to stay in a place that
was cheaper than a hotel, also giving them the proper privacy, they got the idea of
exchanging their house with another family in the place they wanted to go to.
This problem can be seen as a directed graph G = (V,E) where the set V of
vertices represents the agents of the problem and the set E is the weight of the edge
from an agent vi to another agent vj if agent vi wants an item from vj. A cycle c is in
this context a swap of items, obtaining an item from the next agent, and the weight
denoted with wc is the sum of the weights of the edges. We deﬁne an exchange as
a collection of disjoint cycles, with the weight of the exchange being the sum of all
cycles weights, and trying to obtain the maximum beneﬁt.
In order to achieve the maximum beneﬁt, we need to introduce another type
of problem, the clearing problem [1], in which the goal is to ﬁnd a maximum-weight
exchange that consists of cycles of length at most a given constant k. This con-
stant must be small because of the logistical constraints on the facilities and human
resources in the hospital that are responsible for performing the transplants. Any
k-cycle requires at least 2k resources, from doctors to operating rooms, to perform
the transplants, making the length of the cycle an important factor; a study has
shown that an improvement in length of more than 3 has no effect on the size of the
exchange [28].
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2.1.1 Kidney Exchange Problem (KEP)
A transplant, as we mentioned before, is the best option for persons with end-stage
kidney disease. Patients that have a donor willing to donate may not be compatible
due to blood type or positive cross-match incompatibilities. This then becomes on an
incompatible patient-donor pair (PDP). The kidney exchange problem is established
from a pool of PDPs, denoting with edges the possibility of compatibility between
these pairs [18].
Figure 2.1: Cycle of length two of a kidney exchange.
An exchange, as mentioned before, is called a two-way exchange or 2-cycle
kidney exchange when there are two incompatible pairs: PDP 1 and PDP 2 (Figure
2.1), where Donor 1 is compatible with Patient 2 and Donor 2 is compatible with
Patient 1 and the pairs can exchange kidneys. Similarly, we can have situations with
three-way exchanges among PDPs (see Figure 2.2).
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Figure 2.2: Cycle of length three of a kidney exchange.
The kidney exchange problem (KEP) is a well-known topic in different coun-
tries, deriving from the barter exchange, as we described before in this thesis. This
problem can be seen as a graph, where the nodes are the agents or patients and
donors, and the edges denote compatibility from a donor to a patient in another
pair of patient-donor.
A cycle represents a possible exchange, in which each patient obtains a kidney
from the next pair of patient-donor, and so on. The weight of a cycle is given by
the sum of all the weights of all edges involved in the cycle, and the weight of an
exchange is the sum of all the cycle weights involved in the exchange. The problem
consists of ﬁnding a collection of cycle of length k or less that maximizes the total
weighted sum. Note that when all weights are equal to one, the problem is equivalent
to ﬁnding the largest amount of transplants among patients.
These cyclic exchanges lead to models allowing cycles only of length at most
k; however, there is another type of exchange that allows for non-cyclic (or chain)
exchanges. These are triggered by altruistic donors [26].
The non-directed donors (NDDs) or altruistic donors are persons with no in-
terest or any beneﬁt particularly that decided to donate a kidney developing a new
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response in the availability with the growing demand in organs needed [19]. Before
kidney exchange programs arise, a NDD would donate his/her kidney to the top
compatible patient in the waiting list. Nowadays, within the context of a kidney
exchange program, PDPs are also involved in the exchange in such a way that the
altruistic donor “starts” a chain exchange by donating to a PDP which in turns do-
nates to another PDP and so on. The last PDP in the chain donates to the waiting
list. This chain exchange is illustrated in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Chain exchange example.
Kidney pair donation has its issues. For instance, a study by Villa and Pa-
trone [30] evaluates some mechanisms to show how some NND may be subject to
possible manipulations from patients and donors and the misrepresentation of pri-
vate pieces of information from these persons to motivate living donations for the
kidney exchange problem. With the use of game theory and the use of a model,
they measured the response of the model with complete information and with in-
complete information to see how that impacts the compatibility between recipients
and donors.
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2.1.2 Kidney Exchange Program
A kidney exchange program can be controversial because of all the legislative barriers
when an implementation of a program such as this is considered, especially for
countries with a low rate of cadaver harvesting. A country that considers a kidney
exchange program must face variables such as the acceptance of patients to enter
the programs and his donors, and how patients can be included when they accepted.
According the practice standards in countries implementing kidney paired-
donation programs [25], it is important to assess the psychological condition of every
person involved in a transplant before any schedule takes place. Patients and donors
must be fully aware of both the beneﬁts and the risks of such operation, and the
decision must be made willingly under mental stability conditions.
The ﬁrst time that a kidney exchange program has been used as a concept to
help or support programs for deceased donors in the USA is described by Rapaport
[23]. Available programs cannot meet the demand for kidneys, and several studies
about these programs have been conducted with the goal of presenting the maximum
number of compatible transplants on the basis of the information about the patients,
and waiting list used.
These days, there are studies on different approaches on how kidney exchange
programs can be conducted more efficiently. As explained by Ashlagi et al. [4],
as the kidney exchange program grows and becomes more important the roll of
the hospital in the transplants also becomes an issue because more persons are
involved in the care of patients and donors. The hospitals try to ﬁnd the maximum
number of transplants, but there is an incentive to ﬁnd the matches inside the
hospital. Different mechanisms might need to be employed for matches between
different hospitals and for internal matches.
Chapter 3
Methodology
With a case study, we explore what effects a kidney exchange program can have
and how it can help the society of the state in Nuevo Leo´n and in the country as a
whole. Using real data of patients on the waiting list, such as blood type and age,
we want to provide information about how transplants can be performed in each of
the hospitals involved and what happens if the information about the patients on
the waiting list is made public so that more matches can be made and more lives
can be saved.
We try to show the impact of the implementation of a real kidney exchange
program and give options about real matches between patients that are now on
dialysis treatment and hoping for a better quality of life and a cheaper treatment.
3.1 The need of kidney Paired Donation
Programs
The main problem in Me´xico is that, for some reason, the hospital institutions do not
share their information among them. This causes that even if a patient is compatible
with a donor from a different hospital, the transplant cannot be carried out because
between the barrier of the institutions.
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The state of Nuevo Leo´n has several hospital and private clinics, but not all
of them are authorized to perform transplants. The largest and most renowned
hospital in the state is the Dr. Jose´ Euleterio Gonzalez University Hospital.
In Me´xico, this focus on health care comes from recent interest on ﬁnding new
forms to seek a solution to the organ demand that has been growing. In the last few
years, between 1999 and 2009 only 20,154 kidney transplants were performed [12].
Other countries already run this type of programs to probe the reactions and
the score results of patient-donor pairs registered in these programs [11]. Ross et
al. [29] discuss how different factors can affect the beneﬁts of the kidney exchange
program and how the impact of each factor can be estimated.
On the other hand, in Me´xico, according to the annual report of the CENATRA
from 2018, the ﬁrst simultaneous transplant was realized on two incompatible PDPs
was carried out in 2016 [9]. Other paired transplants followed [7, 6]. However, these
matches came from isolated efforts, and not as a result of using KEP models. In
Me´xico, there ir not any kidney paired donation program. In contrast, there are other
countries where these type of programs are now operating bringing great beneﬁts
to many patients. This highlights the importance of this thesis, that addresses the
idea of implementing a kidney paired donation program in Mexico aiming at saving
more lives.
3.2 Main Methodology
Chapter 5 focuses on the proposed experiments and the results that we obtained in
the case study discussed in this thesis. The order followed in this study is based on
previously studied algorithms for solutions of a problem that is of vital importance
for the country and the state.
First, for the experimentation, we need the waiting lists from diverse institu-
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tions and the corresponding procedures to obtain information about the patients,
such as blood type and age of each patient. Then, to complete the information needed
for the experiments, we simulated the information of the living donors, which was
not given because of the conﬁdentiality of this information, to obtain the donors of
each person on the waiting list. Further details are given in Chapter 5.
For the next step of the experimental stage, an experimental design is set
with the goal of investigating several issues and assessing the different KEP models.
Experiments are run over a sample of randomly generated instances. The individual
instances are solved using cycle-only or chain-and-cycle KEP models (described in
Chapter 4) depending on the speciﬁc experiment.
Chapter 4
Formulations for the kidney
exchange problem
Over the years, many different formulations for the kidney exchange problem have
been proposed, incorporating different forms for its solutions combining cycles and
chains or just using one of the forms for the exchanges. The most used one is the
cycle formulation [5], in which the integer programming (IP) model is used only for
cycles, with the nodes representing the patient-donor pairs. Another formulation
previously proposed in the literature is the edge formulation [28], which assigns a
decision variable to each of the edges or arcs of the generated graph.
Some other formulations are the extended edge formulation [10] and the parti-
tioned edge formulation proposed in [24], in which different formulations for cycles
exclusively and chains and cycles are examined, with the intention to explore whether
this formulation can present a better and faster form for a solution to the kidney
exchange problem so that more transplants can be included in the solution.
In addition, there are formulations that combine cycles, such as the formulation
mentioned before, but that also involve chains in the solution, for example, the arc-
based formulation [3], which uses a variable for both chains and cycles.
As we mentioned before, there are several formulations for this problem, and
16
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they have been elaborated and explored by many researchers. For the purposes of
this thesis we use the two formulations proposed in [5] and [3] to confront the actual
situation in Me´xico and give a wide picture of how the life expectation of people on
waiting lists and on a dialysis treatment can be improved when transplants can be
performed.
The use of the cycle formulation is with the intention to see how transplants
can be done in situations where there are not altruistic donors as is commonly the
case. Nevertheless, for contrasting purposes, we also consider chain-and-cycle KEP
models with unlimited chain length.
4.1 Cycle formulation
The ﬁrst formulation represents an alternative IP model used for the purposes of this
thesis; we called it the cycle formulation [1], which uses only cycles in the solution.
Let ζ(k) be the set of all cycles in G with a length of at most k. We assume that a
cycle is an ordered set of arcs. Deﬁne a variable zC for each cycle C ∈ ζ(k):
zC =
8<
:
1 if cycle C is selected for the exchange,
0 otherwise.
Denote by V (C) ⊆ V the set of edges that belong to cycle C. The model can
be written as follows (where wC =
P
(i,j)∈C wij):
Maximize
X
C∈ζk
wCzC (4.1)
subject to
X
C:i∈V (C)
zC ≤ 1 i ∈ V (4.2)
zC ∈ {0, 1} C ∈ ζ(k) (4.3)
In the case of unitary weights, wC equals the number of edges in C, i.e., the
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number of transplants associated with cycle C. The objective function (4.1) maxi-
mizes the weighted number of transplants. Constraints (4.2) ensure that every vertex
is in at most one of the selected cycles (i.e., each donor may donate only one kidney,
and each patient may receive only one kidney). Compared to the edge formulation
[1], the difficulty is the exponential number of variables. The number of cycles can
grow exponentially with k.
Figure 4.1: Example of a pool with PDPs and NDDs.
An interpretation of how this formulation works is given in Figure 4.1, in
which we give an example of a pool that involves only patient-donor pairs for the
implementation of the cycle formulation for this study.
Thus, if we give a solution to the implementation of the cycle formulation, we
can see that in Figure 4.2 we ﬁnd a cycle of length three for the pool example, as
an illustration on how the formulation works and how it is going to be used in this
study.
The natural conditions of this formulation can make it difficult to solve, such
that a lot of computational effort might be needed. It is well known that the cycle-
only model with no limit on k is solvable in polynomial time. However, the cases
for k ﬁxed, are NP-hard. Nevertheless, instances of reasonable size can be solved
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exactly by means of existing KEP models.
Figure 4.2: Example of solution with cycles of length 2.
4.2 Cycle-and-Chain Formulation
Now we describe the second model for solving the KEP, inspired by a solution to
the price-collecting traveling salesman problem (PC-TSP) [3]. Recall that in the
traveling salesman problem (TSP) one is given a list of cities and the cost of going
between pairs of cities, and the goal is to ﬁnd a cycle visiting each city exactly once
at the minimum cost. In the PC-TSP, again one must ﬁnd a cycle visiting each city
at most once, but now one has the option of skipping some cities entirely and paying
a penalty. Qualitatively, the PC-TSP problem is similar to the KEP in that one
wants to ﬁnd long paths in a graph without the need to visit every node.
The set V is partitioned into sets N (the NDDs) and P (the pairs of incompat-
ible donors and patients). For u; v ∈ V , a directed edge from u to v in E indicates
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that the donor in node u is compatible with the patient in node v.
We introduce some notation. For each v ∈ V , let δ−(v) be the edges pointing
to v and δ+(v) be the edges outgoing from v. Likewise, for a set of nodes S ∈ V , let
δ−(S) for each cycle C be of a length of at most k, and we introduce a new variable
zC that indicates whether we are using the cycle C.
Now, zC is a variable for every feasible cycle C, and xij is a variable for edges
in unbounded chains, deﬁned as follows:
zC =
8<
:
1 if cycle C is selected for the exchange,
0 otherwise.
xij =
8<
:
1 if edge (i, j) is used in a chain,
0 otherwise.
In addition to this, some auxiliary variables f ei and f
o
i for all i ∈ V for the ﬂow
entering into i and the ﬂow going out from i, respectively, are deﬁned to simplify
the formulation. Then, the PC-TSP-based formulation (PC-TSP) can be expressed
as below:
Maximize
X
(i,j)∈E
xijwij +
X
C∈Ck
zcwc (4.4)
subject to
X
(i,j)∈E
xij = f
e
i i ∈ V (4.5)
X
(i,j)∈E
xij = f
o
i i ∈ V (4.6)
f oi +
X
C∈ζk(i)
zC ≤ f
e
i +
X
C∈ζk(i)
zC ≤ 1 i ∈ P (4.7)
f oi ≤ 1 i ∈ N (4.8)X
(j,m):j∈S¯,m∈S
xjm ≥ f
e
i S ⊆ P, i ∈ S (4.9)
xij ∈ {0, 1} (i, j) ∈ E (4.10)
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zC ∈ {0, 1} C ∈ ζk (4.11)
The objective function (4.4) maximizes the weighted number of transplants
between chains and cycles in the solution. Constraints (4.5) deﬁne the ﬂow entering
into each node, and constraints (4.6) represent the ﬂow out of each node, such that
the ﬂow entering into and out of each node is the same regardless of whether a
patient receives a kidney or not. In constraints (4.7), we establish that every pair
in the solution must be in a cycle or in a chain and that the ﬂow out of any node i
must be at most the ﬂow coming into the same node.
Chapter 5
Experimental work
This chapter presents the computational experiments aiming at assessing the poten-
tial impact of a kidney exchange program under various scenarios.
In the ﬁrst part of the work, experiments associated with the cycle-only version
of the KEP (model discussed in Section 4.1) are carried out. In particular, the
following experiments are carried out:
1. Solving individual databases considering cycle-only models.
2. Solving combined databases considering cycle-only models.
In the ﬁrst experiments, we solve each individual database using cycle-only
models, chain-only models and cycle-and-chain models (with cycle cardinality limit
set to k = 2 and 3) under no priorities (all objective weights equal to 1). In the
second experiment, we assess the impact of having combined databases compared to
individual databases, again, under no priorities (all objective weights equal to 1).
In the second part of the work, experiments associated with the chain-only and
chain-and-cycle versions of the KEP (models discussed in Section 4.2) are carried
out. In particular, the following experiments are carried out:
1. Solving individual databases considering chain-only models.
22
Chapter 5. Experimental work 23
2. Solving individual databases considering chain-and cycle models.
3. Solving combined databases considering chain-only models.
4. Solving combined databases considering chain-and-cycle models.
All the experimentation was carried out on a workstation with Intel XEON
processor at 3.4 GHz and 16 GB of RAM. The solution algorithms for solving the
KEP models were made available by [13] and [3]. The ﬁrst algorithm were compiled
with the 1.7 Java compiler and 10.0.17763.0 C++ compiler and whenever necessary
linked to CPLEX 12.7 using Concert Technology for Java and C++.
For the formulations of the solutions to the problem, two different algorithms
of solutions for each model were used. For the cycle formulation, the algorithm
developed by Dickerson [13] was used. For the chain-and-cycle formulation, the
algorithm developed by Anderson et al. [3] was used. In particular, we use John
Dickerson implementation of this algorithm, the one proposed for Anderson in 2015,
was used.
5.1 Description of databases and test
instances
Although we have complete patient information in each databases, for conﬁdentiality
reasons potential donor information is not available either for protecting the donor,
or simply, because a patient has not donor yet. However, one the main objectives of
this thesis is precisely to assess how these patients can be beneﬁt from a potential
kidney exchange program. To this end, we proceed to simulate donors for each
patient following the blood type distributions and patient-donor relationship of the
Mexican population. This type of studies have been carried out before, see for
example Gentry et al. [15] for a study made in the American population and Herrera
Medrano [16
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These are serious studies that take into account the blood type distribution,
the proportion of each type of relationship between patient and donor (e.g., spouse,
children, parent, etc.), the frequency of the alleles inherited by each child, and so on.
The state institution brings the waiting list of the patients already on a waiting list
or in dialysis treatment in that hospital. We use the following real-world databases
facilitated by some state- and nation-wide institutions:
• San Jose´ Hospital (SJH): Comprised of 35 patients as of 14/Dec/2018.
• Dr. Jose´ Euleterio Gonzalez University Hospital (UH): Comprised of 15 pa-
tients as of 14/Dec/2018.
• Public institutions and small private hospitals in Nuevo Leo´n (SSNL): Com-
prised of 1086 patients as of 14/Dec/2018.
• Nation-wide information from Centro Nacional de Trasplantes (CENATRA):
Comprised of 17365 patients as of 14/Dec/2018.
The hospitals and institutions mentioned before each provided a database of in-
formation about the patients including blood type, age, and sex and this information
was used to generate the needed information of all the living donors participating
in experiments and ﬁnd the solutions to show the impact of the study of this thesis.
Each database has different size. In each database we found relevant information
about the patients, but the most important for our study is that of blood type.
The UH database stands out because among all the patients listed, there were
only two present blood types (O and A), such that for the experiments with chains
for this database we only used instances considering two different blood types for
altruistic donors in the use of chains and ignored the other blood types because we
did not ﬁnd any chain as we started with an altruistic donor with a speciﬁc blood
type.
For each experiment carried out, we use the same information of patients from
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the provided database, and we considered some parameters for the experimentation
as discussed below:
• Number of pairs on matches are determined by the length of each database
– 15 patients from the UH database
– 35 patients from the SJH database
– 1,086 patients from the SSNL database
– 17,367 patients from the CENATRA database
• Length of the cycles for the cycle-only models is set to either 2 or 3.
• The length of the chains in chain-related models is unlimited.
• The weight wij in the KEP model objective function is set to 1, that is, we are
looking at maximizing number of transplants.
• For the chain-related experiments, where at least one altruistic donor is needed,
we consider only one altruistic donor per instance.
For the solution of both formulations we make use of exact algorithms to solve
the problems proposed before for all the experimentation. For the ﬁrst formulation
we make use of the algorithm implementation proposed by Dickerson [13] and for the
second formulation we use the Anderson implementation [3] to solve the problems,
keeping in mind that we obtain the instance for the algorithms from the simulator
[16].
For the database combination experiments, it is sought to show and evaluate
the importance of open collaboration between the hospitals. We illustrate different
cases by merging databases two at a time. For instance, we merge database A and
B, and create one single combined instance. We solve this instance and compare its
solution to that of the individual database solutions. By doing this, we can establish
the importance of open collaboration between hospitals.
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5.2 Special considerations for the CENATRA
database
It is important to notice that the CENATRA database, with over 17,000 patients,
is practically intractable. In other words, the KEP models can not be solved with
an instance of this size. In addition, it is also very unrealistic to think that each of
the over 17,000 patients will bring a donor. Therefore, we generate instances taking
a proportion of the total. For example, we can generate an instance of size 10% of
the total by randomly choosing patients from the whole database until the desired
number is achieved.
With these guidelines we created 20 different instances for each size that goes
from 10% to 30% of the CENATRA database size.
5.3 Experimental Results
In this section, we present the results, analysis, and discussion of each of the exper-
iments carried out. Section 5.3.1 presents the results related to cycle-only models.
Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 present the results related to chain-only and chain-and-cycle
models, respectively.
5.3.1 Experiments considering cycle-only models
For each of the databases we solve the cycle-only models for two different cases:
cycles of length 2 and 3, respectively. It is assumed each patient in the database
has a living donor and therefore participates in the exchange. Each of the Figures
5.1 to 5.7 shows the number of transplants in the vertical axis (optimal value of the
objective function) for the two different models, shown in the horizontal axis. Recall
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that 4 instances are solved for each model.
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Figure 5.1: Results for the UH database (n = 15) for cycle-only models.
The results for the UH database are shown in Figure 5.1. As we can see in
Figure 5.1, when the length of the cycle is ﬁxed at 2 the average number of transplants
performed is 2.8 out of the 15 pairs used. When the length of the cycle grows, as an
expected behavior, the number of transplants performed increases and we observe
that the average number of transplants is 3.6 when the length of the cycle is ﬁxed
at 3 for this database.
Figure 5.2 shows the results for the SJH database, with 35 patients. The
summary of average results is displayed in Table 5.1. It is observed ﬁrst, as in the
previous experiments, that the average number of transplants when k = 2 and k = 3
is 10.0 and 12.65, respectively. This is consistent with the previous experiments. Fur-
thermore, as we allow more patients to participate in the exchange, the proportion
of the total also increases. That is, in the previous data set, on average, 2.8 out of 15
were beneﬁted under the 2-cycle model, representing 18.6% of the total, whereas, for
this data set, on average, 10 out of 35 patients were beneﬁted, representing 28.6%
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of the total. The same behavior is observed for the k = 3 models.
Table 5.1: Average number of transplants for models with cycle length of 2 and 3.
Number of patients Cycle length Database Average number of transplants Fraction of total
15
2
UH 2.8 18.66%
35 SJH 10.0 28.57%
1086 SSNL 420.0 38.67%
1136 CENATRA 445.5 39.21%
15
3
UH 3.6 24.00%
35 SJH 12.7 36.14%
1086 SSNL 453.2 41.73%
1136 CENATRA 480.6 42.30%
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Figure 5.2: Results for the SJH database (n = 35) for cycle-only models.
In the following experiment, we attempt to show how collaboration between
hospitals may be beneﬁcial to patients. To this end, we now combine two of the
individual databases into one (called the combined databases) and solve the problem
for both k = 2 and k = 3 cases. The idea is to compare the results of the combined
instance with those of the individual databases.
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The results for the k = 2 and k = 3 cases are shown in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4,
respectively. Again, the vertical axis indicates the number of transplants, and the
horizontal axis shows the four different cases: (a) UH individual database, (b) SJH
individual database, (c) sum of (a) and (b), and (d) UH+SJH combined database.
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of individual and combined database (50 patients) for cycle-
only models of length 2.
As we can see from Figure 5.3 and 5.4, the impact is signiﬁcant. On average,
the optimal number of pairs found for transplantation in the combined database is
considerably larger than that of the sum of the optimal individual databases. This
is observed for both cases, k = 2 and k = 3. Table 5.2 and 5.3 show the same
results for k = 2 and k = 3, respectively, but itemized by each individual instance.
In each table, the row indicates the instance solved and the columns indicate the
case being solved. The last column indicates the relative improvement obtained by
solving the combined database with respect to the sum of the optimal solution of
the individual databases. As we can see from Table 5.2 and 5.3, an average relative
improvement of 100% and 144% is observed. This clearly shows that collaboration
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between hospitals by sharing their databases for a common good yields many more
patients being beneﬁted.
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Figure 5.4: Comparison of individual and combined database (50 patients) for cycle-
only models of length 3.
Another interesting observation, as indicated in the last column of both tables,
is that all instances, but one, showed some improvement when using the combined
database. For all others, at least a 20% improvement was observed. The reason for
this is that the combined compatibility graph contains many edges between the two
individual graphs. This produces a signiﬁcant number of new feasible solutions that
that of the individual databases. Therefore, when the combined graph is solved,
more cycles among individual graphs can be found.
Another interesting result occurs in the 2-cycle instances. From Table 5.2,
instances 9, 10, and 17, when solved for the UH database obtained zero pairs. That
is, it was not possible to ﬁnd any 2-length cycle in each of those instances. However,
when these instances were solved by combining them with the SJH database, it
was possible to match many patients from the UH database with some of the SJH
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Table 5.2: Comparison of individual and combined database (50 patients) for cycle-
only models of length 2 by individual instance.
Instance UH SJH UH + SJH Combined Improvement (%)
1 2 10 12 20 66.66
2 4 10 14 14 0.00
3 4 6 10 24 140.00
4 2 8 10 12 20.00
5 5 6 8 14 24.00
6 2 12 14 16 14.28
7 2 14 16 20 25.00
8 2 8 10 14 40.00
9 0 6 6 26 333.33
10 0 10 10 28 180.00
11 2 10 12 24 100.00
12 4 8 12 24 100.00
13 2 8 10 18 80.00
14 0 6 6 18 200.00
15 4 10 14 16 14.28
16 0 12 12 12 0.00
17 0 6 6 26 333.33
18 4 8 12 22 83.33
19 2 10 12 18 50.00
20 2 6 8 20 150.00
Average 100.08
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Table 5.3: Comparison of individual and combined database (50 patients) for cycle-
only models of length 3 by individual instance.
Instance UH SJH UH + SJH Combined Improvement (%)
1 3 11 14 34 142.85
2 6 14 20 24 20.00
3 5 7 12 30 150.00
4 2 10 12 25 108.33
5 6 10 16 31 93.75
6 3 13 16 29 81.25
7 5 18 23 25 8.69
8 3 10 13 22 69.23
9 0 7 7 41 485.71
10 0 12 12 32 166.66
11 3 13 16 30 87.50
12 5 10 15 36 140.00
13 3 11 14 29 107.14
14 0 7 7 30 328.57
15 5 12 17 28 64.70
16 0 15 15 27 80.00
17 0 8 8 34 325.00
18 5 10 15 34 126.66
19 3 13 16 27 68.75
20 2 8 10 32 220.00
Average 143.74
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database resulting in a signiﬁcant increase.
Finally, in Figure 5.5 we show a comparison between 2-cycle and 3-cycle models
under each of the four previously discussed cases. In the ﬁgure, the horizontal axis
indicates: (a) UH database, (b) SJH database, (c) sum (a)+(b), and (d) combined
data set, and vertical axis show the number of transplants. As we can see, the
cycle length plays an important roll as well, thus it is strongly recommended, when
possible, try to seek 3-cycle exchanges. This may not be always possible due to
hospital limitations, though.
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Figure 5.5: Comparison between models with cycles of length 2 and 3 on individual
and combined databases.
We now present the results for the NL database with 1086 patients. In this
experiment, given the number of patients is very high, we solved the instances for
several donor to patient ratio values. Figure 5.6 shows the results, where the hori-
zontal axis indicates the donor to patient ratio. For instance, the 10% column means
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that instances were solved assuming 10% of donors, that is instances of size 108 were
solved.
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Figure 5.6: Comparison between models with cycles of length 2 and 3 and different
donor to patient ratio on the NL database.
From this ﬁgure, we can see the possible increase in the total number of trans-
plants as the donors show an interest in a kidney exchange program, and this is
represented in donor percentage. As we can see from the ﬁgure, there is an evident
contrast in the extreme cases. For example, in the 10% donor/patient ratio col-
umn (that is, instance of size 108), we have as a result an average of 29.5 matches,
whereas in the 100% donor/patient ratio column (that is, instance of size 1086), we
have on average 420 matches. The former represents around 27% of the total and
the latter represents 38% of the total. Table 5.4 shows the average results for each
combination.
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The same behavior is observed when looking at the 3-cycle instances. On
average, 36.0 and 453.2 matches are found for the 10% and 100% donor/patient
ratios, respectively, representing 33% and 42% of the total, respectively.
We now repeat the same experiment but using a combined data set consisting
of NL, UH, and SJH databases, that is, 1136 pairs. Results are displayed in Figure
5.7.
The use of donor to patient ratio allows us to clearly see the advantage gained
when more donors are willing to participate in this type of exchange programs.
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Figure 5.7: Comparison between models with cycles of length 2 and 3 and different
donor to patient ratio on the augmented database (NL + UH + SJH, 1136 pairs).
As we can see from Figure 5.7, the results are very similar to those from the
previous experiment. Allowing cycles of size 3 results in more matches and therefore
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Table 5.4: Comparison between models with cycles of length 2 and 3 and different
donor to patient ratio on the NL database based on the average number of trans-
plants.
Donor/patient ratio (%)
Average number of transplants
k = 2 k = 3
10 29.40 36.05
20 71.60 85.00
30 115.80 134.70
40 163.70 184.35
50 206.80 229.75
60 246.70 269.65
70 287.90 315.50
80 334.60 363.50
90 384.60 412.65
should be pursued. From these last two experiments we can conclude that it is very
important to motivate a donation culture among the population. The more people
willing to participate the more people can be helped.
In our last experiment in this section, we carry out a similar study as that of the
previous experiment using this time the nation-wide CENATRA database. Again,
because this database has 17,365, we run a few experiments setting the donor to
patient ratio to 10%, 20% and 30%. This last instance has a size of 17,365 patients,
which is about the size of the KEP model that can be solved by the optimization
algorithm. The results are presented in Figure 5.8
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Figure 5.8: Results of models with cycles of length 2 and different donor to patient
ratio on the nation-wide CENATRA database (17,365 patients).
As a general conclusion from these last experiments, we can see that even a
small participation of 10% (involving 1,736 donors) results in 700 matches, which is
very good. As the donor/patient ratio increases so does the number of matches.
5.3.2 Experiments considering chain-only models
In this section, we carry out some experiments considering chain-only models. Recall,
that kidney exchange based on chains arises when there are altruistic donors. To
this end, in our problem instances we are assuming there is only one altruistic donor.
This donor can have any blood type,, which will be explained in each experiment.
Clearly, the more altruistic donors we have, the more chains that can be formed.
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However, for the purposes of these experiment only one altruistic donor per instance
is considered.
In the ﬁrst experiment, we solved the chain-only model for each possible al-
truistic donor blood type (that is, four cases) in the UH database. The ﬁgure only
includes the result for blood type O and A, because no chains were found in the
other two cases (blood type B and AB). The results are shown in Figure 5.9.
As can be seen from Figure 5.9, more matches are found when the altruistic
donor has blood type O as compared with blood type A. This is somehow explained
by the fact that a blood type donor is compatible with types A, B, AB and O,
whereas blood type A is only compatible with type A and AB. Therefore, there are
more chances of ﬁnding paths if the altruistic donor has type O.
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Figure 5.9: Results for the UH database (n = 15) for the chain-only model.
We repeat the same experiment, but this time using the SJH database. The
results are shown in Figure 5.10, where the horizontal axis shows the altruistic donor
Chapter 5. Experimental work 39
blood type. Type AB is not shown because there are not compatible pairs.
As can be seen, the average number of matches is higher when altruistic donor
is of blood type O, which is consistent with the previous experiment. It is also inter-
esting to see how the average match pattern changes as a function of the altruistic
donor blood type. The variance is a lot higher when the altruistic donor has blood
type A.
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Figure 5.10: Results for the SJH database (n = 35) for the chain-only model.
In the following experiment, we solve the UH, SJH and combined (UH+SJH)
databases under the chain-only model assuming an altruistic donor of blood type A.
The results of the individual instances are shown in Table 5.5.
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Table 5.5: Comparison of individual and combined database for chain-only models
with altruistic blood type A by individual instance.
Instance UH SJH UH + SJH Combined Improvement (%)
1 1 6 7 7 0.00
2 3 6 9 10 11.11
3 6 0 6 7 16.66
4 3 1 4 7 75.00
5 5 6 11 11 0.00
6 6 6 12 13 8.33
7 6 0 6 7 16.66
8 1 6 7 7 0.00
9 4 6 10 11 10.00
10 1 6 7 7 0.00
11 1 0 1 1 0.00
12 6 6 12 12 0.00
13 3 0 3 7 133.33
14 2 6 8 9 12.50
15 6 6 12 12 0.00
16 3 0 3 7 133.33
17 0 1 1 1 0.00
18 6 6 12 13 8.33
19 0 1 1 7 600.00
20 0 0 0 7 700.00
Average 86.26
In the following experiment, we solve the UH, SJH and combined (UH+SJH)
databases under the chain-only model assuming an altruistic donor of blood type B.
The results of the individual instances are shown in Table 5.6.
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Table 5.6: Comparison of individual and combined database for chain-only models
with altruistic blood type B by individual instance.
Instance UH SJH UH + SJH Combined Improvement (%)
1 0 6 6 6 0.00
2 0 6 6 6 0.00
3 0 6 6 6 0.00
4 0 6 6 6 0.00
5 0 5 5 6 20.00
6 0 6 6 6 0.00
7 0 6 6 6 0.00
8 0 6 6 6 0.00
9 0 6 6 6 0.00
10 0 6 6 6 0.00
11 0 6 6 6 0.00
12 0 5 5 6 20.00
13 0 3 3 6 100.00
14 0 6 6 6 0.00
15 0 6 6 6 0.00
16 0 6 6 6 0.00
17 0 6 6 6 0.00
18 0 6 6 6 0.00
19 0 6 6 6 0.00
20 0 6 6 6 0.00
Average 7.00
As we can see from Table 5.6, the results were not as good as expected due in
part to the fact that only the SJH database reported patients with this blood type.
In addition, the combined data set has larger cardinality, therefore the proportion of
matches found is observed relatively modest when compared to other blood types.
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5.3.3 Experiments considering chain-and-cycle models
In this section, we carry out some experiments considering chain-and-cycle models.
This represents the higher ﬂexibility as both paired-exchange and chain-exchange
are allowed. Again, as in the previous sections we are assuming there is only one
altruistic donor per instance.
For these experiments we use the same instances used in the previous section.
A critical issue to investigate is the possible effect we might ﬁnd on the ﬁnal solutions
when allowing both chains and cycles.
As we will see in Figure 5.11, it was observed that the databases behave in the
same way for the different blood type of the altruistic donor. Thus, the altruistic
donor blood type does not seem to play a signiﬁcant role in the individual databases.
However, observations are different when solving the combined database.
In the following experiments, we present ﬁrst results from instances where the
altruistic donor has blood type O. Unlimited size chains, and cycle length of size 2
and 3 are considered. This is followed by results for altruistic donor blood type A,
B, and AB. In this case, it was possible to obtain and report results for blood type
AB as the number of matches is also inﬂuenced by the formation of cycles.
Figure 5.11 displays the results obtained on the UH database. As can be
seen, results are better when altruistic donor has type O, which is to be expected
given type O is a universal donor, thus more chances to ﬁnd matches. Figure 5.12
displays the results obtained on the UH database. Table 5.7 displays a summary of
the results. As can been seen from the table, the results from the cycle-and-chain
models are signiﬁcantly better than those from cycle-only models. This happens
because the former models allow for more people to get involved and therefore have
a better chance to ﬁnd a match.
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Figure 5.11: Comparison using different blood type in the altruistic donor and cycle
length for the UH.
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Figure 5.12: Comparison using different blood type in the altruistic donor and cycle
length for the SJH.
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Table 5.7: Comparison of individual and combined database for chain-and-cycle
models with altruistic blood type A by individual instance.
k = 2 k = 3
Instance UH SJH UH+SJH Combined Improvement (%) UH SJH UH+SJH Combined Improvement (%)
1 2 8 10 36 260.00 2 11 13 43 230.76
2 4 12 16 35 118.75 4 13 17 39 129.41
3 10 4 14 33 135.71 10 5 15 38 153.33
4 2 12 14 26 85.71 3 14 17 33 94.11
5 5 17 22 24 9.09 5 19 24 32 33.33
6 6 12 18 38 111.11 6 16 22 41 86.36
7 1 2 3 30 900.00 1 3 4 38 850.00
8 8 14 22 40 81.81 8 15 23 44 91.30
9 2 5 7 32 357.14 3 6 9 38 322.22
10 2 10 12 40 233.33 3 12 15 45 200.00
11 0 14 14 28 100.00 0 15 15 37 146.66
12 2 10 12 28 133.33 3 12 15 34 126.66
13 2 16 18 18 0.00 3 20 23 24 4.34
14 0 7 7 18 157.14 0 10 10 28 180.00
15 2 7 9 12 33.33 2 12 14 26 85.71
16 6 11 17 28 64.70 6 13 19 34 78.94
17 3 6 9 38 322.22 4 7 11 41 272.72
18 3 11 14 22 57.14 3 13 16 34 112.50
19 7 2 9 32 255.55 7 3 10 38 280.00
20 8 16 24 46 91.66 8 17 25 48 92.00
Average 175.38 Average 178.52
Figures 5.13 and 5.14 display the results for the chain-and-cycle models of
length 2 and 3, respectively, when the altruistic donor has blood type A. Comparing
these with the ones in Figure 5.3 and 5.4 we see that the average obtained is 31.2
and 35, for the chain-and-cycle models using a cycle length of 2 and 3, respectively
and average for the cycle-only model is 19.5 and 30 with cycle length of 2 and 3
respectively.
As can be seen in Figure 5.13 and Figure 5.14, we observe that the results for
the individual databases are similar; however, the number of matches signiﬁcantly
grows when solving the combined database. The average number of transplants
found in the combined data set is 30.2 and almost 40, for the models with cycle
length of 2 and 3, respectively.
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Figure 5.13: Comparison of individual and combined database for chain-and-cycle
models (k = 2) with altruistic blood type A.
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Figure 5.14: Comparison of individual and combined database for chain-and-cycle
models (k = 3) with altruistic blood type A.
Chapter 5. Experimental work 46
Next, we present the results obtained when considering an altruistic donor of
blood type B. Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16 show the results for the individual and
combined data sets under k = 2 and k = 3, respectively. Table 5.8 displays the
same results itemized by individual instance. As we can see from Figure 5.15, the
results are similar to the ones obtained with an altruistic donor with blood type
A. Contrasting with the previous experiment (blood type A), we can see that for
instance, the average number of matches found for the sum of both databases under
blood type A (Table 5.7) is 30.2 for k = 2 and 36.75 for k = 3. For this new
experiment, this average (Table 5.8) improves to 34.7 and 41.4, respectively.
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Figure 5.15: Comparison of individual and combined database for chain-and-cycle
models (k = 2) with altruistic blood type B.
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Figure 5.16: Comparison of individual and combined database for chain-and-cycle
models (k = 3) with altruistic blood type B.
As we can see in the Table 5.8, the use of the combined database consistently
outperforms the sum of individual databases for both cases (k = 2 and k = 3).
Furthermore, a better average improvement was observed for the case k = 3 when
compared with the case k = 2.
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Table 5.8: Comparison of individual and combined database for cycle-and-chain
models with altruistic blood type B by individual instance.
k = 2 k = 3
Instance UH SJH UH+SJH Combined Improvement (%) UH SJH UH+SJH Combined Improvement (%)
1 3 7 10 38 280.00 3 8 11 42 281.81
2 0 7 7 34 385.71 0 8 8 40 400.00
3 2 8 10 38 280.00 3 10 13 42 223.07
4 6 14 20 34 70.00 8 14 22 46 109.09
5 2 8 10 20 100.00 2 9 11 31 181.81
6 2 12 14 28 100.00 2 12 14 36 157.14
7 2 14 16 32 100.00 2 15 17 43 152.94
8 4 16 20 32 60.00 5 17 22 42 90.90
9 2 6 8 39 387.50 3 6 9 45 400.00
10 8 3 11 38 245.45 9 4 13 47 261.53
11 0 16 16 40 150.00 0 17 17 46 170.58
12 2 15 17 34 100.00 2 16 18 41 127.77
13 4 16 20 45 125.00 5 17 22 47 113.63
14 2 4 6 34 466.66 2 7 9 40 344.44
15 0 20 20 32 60.00 0 20 20 39 95.00
16 0 8 8 34 325.00 0 9 9 42 366.66
17 4 12 16 32 100.00 4 15 19 35 84.21
18 6 20 26 26 0.00 8 22 30 37 23.33
19 2 12 14 42 200.00 3 13 16 44 175.00
20 0 26 26 42 61.53 3 26 29 43 48.27
Average 179.84 Average 190.36
Finally, the last set of experiments consider an altruistic donor of blood type
AB. Figure 5.17 and Figure 5.18 show the results for the individual and combined
data sets for k = 24 and k = 3, respectively. Table 5.9 displays the instance
by instance results. From Figures 5.17 and 5.18, the ﬁrst observation is that, as
observed before, using the combined data set is signiﬁcantly better than using the
individual data sets. Thus, collaboration between hospitals is strongly encouraged.
We can also see that allowing cycles of length 3 improves the solution by 1.43% with
respect to allowing cycles of length 2.
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Figure 5.17: Comparison of individual and combined database for chain-and-cycle
models (k = 2) with altruistic blood type AB.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
UH SJH Sum Combined
Database
N
um
be
r o
f t
ra
n
sp
la
nt
s
Figure 5.18: Comparison of individual and combined database for chain-and-cycle
models (k = 3) with altruistic blood type AB.
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Table 5.9: Comparison of individual and combined database for cycle-and-chain
models with altruistic blood type AB by individual instance.
k = 2 k = 3
Instance UH SJH UH + SJH Combined Improvement (%) UH SJH UH + SJH Combined Improvement (%)
1 4 10 14 24 71.42 5 12 17 35 105.88
2 0 10 10 26 160.00 0 13 13 31 138.46
3 4 8 12 30 150.00 4 9 13 38 192.30
4 2 10 12 16 33.33 3 11 14 20 42.85
5 4 8 12 24 100.00 6 10 16 32 100.00
6 0 6 6 20 233.33 0 9 9 26 188.88
7 2 6 8 30 275.00 3 8 11 38 245.45
8 0 10 10 36 260.00 0 16 16 40 150.00
9 2 10 12 16 33.33 2 14 16 24 50.00
10 4 14 18 32 77.77 6 18 24 37 54.16
11 0 12 12 32 166.66 3 16 19 36 89.47
12 4 10 14 26 85.71 6 11 17 36 111.76
13 4 10 14 28 100.00 4 10 14 38 171.42
14 4 10 14 30 114.28 6 12 18 36 100.00
15 2 8 10 16 60.00 2 11 13 25 92.30
16 2 12 14 26 85.71 2 13 15 35 133.33
17 2 6 8 24 200.00 3 8 11 38 245.45
18 4 16 20 30 50.00 5 20 25 37 48.00
19 6 12 18 32 77.77 8 16 24 38 58.33
20 4 8 12 26 116.66 4 9 13 34 161.53
Average 122.55 Average 123.98
Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Main contributions and conclusions
This thesis illustrates the application of a combinatorial optimization problem in the
health care sector. The kidney exchange problem (KEP) has a remarkable impor-
tance due to the potential impact that can have on procuring kidney transplants to
needy patients. This is a clear example of how operations research tools and method-
ologies can help people have a better quality of life, and can help government and
health care providers spend their limited resources wisely.
Kidney exchange programs have been successfully implemented in other coun-
tries. In Me´xico, we have no such programs. Kidney-paired exchange has a tremen-
dous potential for development in Me´xico. The main contribution of this thesis is
to show this potential and impact, by carrying out several meaningful experiments
under different conditions. It was shown how the number of people that could be
beneﬁted by kidney exchange could be very large.
The presented results are very promising. Either in cycle-only models or mod-
els involving chains, many people could be helped by kidney paired-donation. An
interesting observation found was that involving altruistic donor triggers the addi-
tion of chains, resulting in even more matches found. In particular, it was found
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that the numbers of transplants for the experiments involving altruistic donor with
blood type O was better when compared to other blood types.
Another very interesting ﬁnding is that we also show how collaboration between
hospitals and institutions, sharing their databases, could also signiﬁcantly increase
the number of matches. Therefore, collaboration between hospitals is strongly en-
couraged. In particular, we showed that ﬁnding the optimal number of transplants
in the UH and SJH combined database was signiﬁcantly larger than the sum of both
databases optimized individually. This behavior was conclusively observed for all
types of models (cycle-only and chain-related models). This, of course, can have
a tremendous impact should a kidney exchange program be implemented at any
regional level (city-, state-, or nation-wide).
The results obtained in this thesis can certainly be used as a basis for developing
and establishing a kidney exchange program in Me´xico. The main idea behind this
study is to motivate a kidney exchange program implementation due to the fact that
no such program exists as of today in Me´xico.
6.2 Future work
Naturally, this type of problem has many avenues for further research. While this
study focuses on applying optimization tools to address a kidney exchange problem,
there are certainly other areas in organ donation that can be subject to study under
the operations research umbrella. For instance, there are recent studies addressing
liver transplants from the operations research perspective [22, 31], which can be
further investigated in the speciﬁc Mexican situation.
In terms of kidney paired-donation through operations research techniques, one
could enhance the study in several forms. For instance, doing state-by-state analysis
with other state databases, or incorporating other health care institutions into the
equation could be worthy. Now, in this particular study we are assuming every pair
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is equal, and therefore all weights in the objective function were assumed to be equal
to one. However, it could be worthwhile to investigate how the assignment pattern
changes as customer priorities are considered, that is, setting weights to different
values.
In this study, we are assuming deterministic models; however, there have also
been recent studies that consider uncertainty into the decision process [14, 17]. It
would be interesting to carry out a study considering this aspect as well.
From a practical stand-point, a natural next step for an actual implementation
of a kidney exchange program is to investigate the legal matters involved in a project
of this sort. We have shown we have the technology, the models, and the algorithms
for solving KEPs. Now, proper authorities must now research and set the basis for
a feasible developing of a kidney exchange program.
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